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Legislating Trust
John D. Gregory*
As governments in Canada and elsewhere have considered statutes to ensure
that electronic communications are legally effective, they have invariably had to
face questions about the reliability of those communications. Can we trust elec-
tronic messages, documents, and signatures? Are they the same in law as if they
were on paper? What conditions should be imposed in order to give us the right
assurances that we can trust them? To answer these questions properly, we need to
understand the nature of “trust” and the extent to which legislation can be a
source of it, and what other sources should be enlisted to allow prudent legal oper-
ations in the digital age.
INTRODUCTION
In this article I raise and suggest answers to a number of questions that arise
out of the use of electronic communications. Can we trust electronic messages,
documents, signatures? Are they the same in law as if they were on paper? What
conditions should be imposed in order to give us the right assurances that we can
trust them?
I will be describing the legal policy responses to the ubiquity of electronic
communications, with particular reference to electronic commerce and electronic
government, and with a focus on how legislation works in this context.
I. WHAT IS TRUST?
Trust may be understood to be a feeling, a state of mind, about a situation or
about a course of action, and often about other people. (If “hell is other people”,
that is particularly true if one can’t trust them!) It is a feeling of predictability, of
certainty — an anticipation that responses to one’s own actions will be in a foresee-
able and acceptable range.
But let’s look at that statement again: “a feeling of predictability, of cer-
tainty” — which may concord with popular expression — “I feel sure of this” —
but which disguises the rational content of the process. It is not just or even prima-
rily a feeling; it is the result of a calculation. It is an evaluation. It is a judgment.
Information security specialists speak of a “threat-risk analysis” (a TRA) — the
key word being “analysis”.
* General Counsel, Justice Policy Development Branch, Ministry of the Attorney
General (Ontario).The opinions expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the
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Speakers” Series held by the Law & Technology Institute at the Schulich School of
Law on October 25, 2012.
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One may have a gut reaction, but in commercial or official matters at least,
one seldom leaves it at that; one adds an intellectual component.1 As a result, trust
is not likely to be absolute, both because it is a state of mind and because it is a
kind of prediction, as well as being about people, who change. A synonym for
“trust” can be “assurance” — whose cognates are “sure” and “secure”. This article
will discuss the relationship between security and trust, and where the law has been
going on security.
One hears in this universe of discourse about “levels of assurance”. There are
a lot of them, though for ease of discussion and classification and regulation, they
are usually in a low fixed number like three or four. They are not, however, hard
boundaries; it is a continuum: fifty shades of trust.
II. BENEFITS OF TRUST
What is trust for? Why do we care? Trust provides personal, social, and eco-
nomic benefits. The personal benefits are obvious: reduction of stress is perhaps the
main one. As a social benefit, people get along where there is trust. Trust is the
foundation for cooperation, which allows a society to function.
James Surowiecki in The Wisdom of Crowds says “Societies and organizations
work only if people cooperate. It’s impossible for a society to rely on law alone to
make sure citizens act honestly and responsibly . . . The interesting thing is that we
cooperate with strangers.”2
On the economic side, predictability means more confidence to build teams
(and other economic units) and to make deals, to commit one’s resources to the
future, and to depend on other people to keep their word. The security expert Bruce
Schneier describes the large number of people and institutions he has to trust in
order to do a simple repair to his home plumbing: the plumber, not to rob him, not
to attack his wife; the banks to clear his payment; the regulators to certify the com-
petence of the plumber; and others.3
The ability to have confidence in decisions increases the speed at which one
can make decisions. That leads to faster transactions, and this turnover increases
prosperity. It is a bit like the money supply, where the speed of circulation of
money helps measure the health and the functioning of economy. So building trust
leads to wealth creation. The opposite is also true: if we have to check everything
on an individual basis, if we cannot count on economic as well as personal coopera-
tion, things bog down (or never get started.)
1 Some current popular writing on the theme of the speedy and the analytical response to
situations includes Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking
(Penguin, 2005) and Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Doubleday, 2011).
2 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (Doubleday, 2004) at 116-117.
3 Bruce Schneier, Liars and Outliers (Indianapolis: John Wiley and Sons, 2012), at 1.
See also Amelia H Boss, “Searching for Security in the Law of Electronic Commerce”
(1999) 23 Nova L.R.583 at 591, online: Selected Works
<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=amelia_boss>
for another broad description of the elements of trust and security [“Searching for
Security”].
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III. SOURCES OF TRUST
Where does trust come from? A number of sources have been suggested,
which differ in scope and nature and thus effectiveness.4
Personal/Moral: One is taught good behaviour and moral standards as a child.
The moral theme common to most if not all cultures is the golden rule, the exercise
of which would lead to being trustworthy. The lesson carries one through to trust-
ing family and friends, and possibly people of one’s own culture even though the
general rule is not so limited. In practice, lack of familiarity (note the root of that
word, “family”) can diminish trust. Social scientists have found that the practical
limit to personal spheres where knowledge can become trust is somewhere between
one hundred and fifty and five hundred people.5
Social: The social basis for trust can be more widespread. It is based on repu-
tation. It is in one’s interest to be trustworthy because a bad reputation can hurt
one’s life chances and economic chances. The effect of reputation is wider now
than in the past, with the Internet and search engines and effective permanence of
traces of one’s life, which can themselves include comments by others.6
Institutional: This class of incentives to be trustworthy includes pressure from
private organizations that people may belong to and want to keep on the good side
of — including being a member. It also notably includes the law. The state sanc-
tions certain kinds of untrustworthy behaviour, notably by criminal prohibition on
fraud and other forms of dishonesty. The law also enforces promises (contracts)
and protects reasonable expectations — of conduct, of privacy, of rewards. Its ap-
plication can be as broad in scope as a country, but some areas of trustworthy con-
duct are more enforceable by law than others. Given the theme and title of this
article, we will be coming back to this area in some detail.
Technological: Schneier calls this class “security systems”. Such systems can
enforce trust or standards of conduct in ways that law or society cannot: by making
certain actions necessarily have certain consequences, or preventing them from
having others. They can for example ensure that no binding contract will be formed
without consent of the parties by requiring an “I accept” click before any obligation
is imposed. They can prevent unauthorized copying of music or movies by techni-
cal protection measures. They can build in “privacy by design”.7
Security systems also include after-the-fact detection and cure procedures,
such as audits or investigations, and mitigation systems to speed recovery from
losses.
4 Schneier, supra note 3 at 8-9 and Part II.
5 Ibid. at 24 and 46 (re “Dunbar numbers”).
6 Commercial examples of social reputation-building include eBay’s seller rating system,
Slash/dot’s priority postings, and even New York Times and others’ ranking of com-
ments by readers’ or editors’ preferences. Reputation from such diverse sources will
only be as effective as the existence of a persistent identifier allows, so one can trace
elements of reputation to the same person.
7 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Privacy by Design,
online: Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Privacy/Introduction-to-PbD/> [Privacy by Design].
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One recalls the thesis of Lessig and others in late 90s, that “code is law”.8 This
was a very useful perception, that the ways in which technical systems work con-
tain and impose norms, including some degree of trust (or assumptions about trust).
Such code systems can have a very wide scope, certainly international for some
purposes. Consider for example some social media’s limits on permissible content,
most browsers’ security settings, anti-spam or anti-virus software. The ubiquity of
private standards can be a policy issue: how much choice do we really have
whether to participate in social media, use large search engines, and so on? And the
policy content of code is not to be taken for granted, for better or worse (which is a
point of view question in itself — one might like the censorship that Facebook and
Apple, among others, impose.)
All of these forces work in interlocking ways to create a system where there is
more or less trust. This article is about how the law works in this “ecology”.
Note that all these factors work whatever the medium of communication. They
are not special to electronic communication, or to economic activity more than to
other kinds. Some of the most visible developments in technology in the past 25 or
50 years have been in information technology, but the principles have been the
same forever. I can trust my neighbour’s moral upbringing and the general disre-
pute he would bring upon himself if he were to come into my house uninvited and
take away my property. The law prohibits that. But I may also invest in a lock on
the door, as a technological contribution to my trust of my neighbour.
One might say that the technology operates in the absence of trust, or substi-
tutes for trust, but it is also usefully true to say that it creates trusted conduct, con-
duct that allows one to make decisions about one’s own conduct with some confi-
dence. It is a contributor to a system that encourages trust.
IV. WHAT IS DIFFERENT ABOUT E-COMMUNICATIONS?
Given that we have been living in a society and an economy that has depended
on trust (contributed by all of these factors) for a long time, what do electronic
communications bring that changes the calculation and that leads to proposals for
law reform?
A lot of the nervousness comes from the intangibility itself: where is an elec-
tronic document? What is it? I can see the computer but I can’t see the document.
Some kind of software hocus-pocus produces words on a screen or on a printer, but
how do I know they will be the same tomorrow or the same for the person I send
them to? Computers crash. Formats go strange. Storage media deteriorate. And the
malleability of the words and numbers: they are easy to change and it can be hard
to detect the change. Why would I trust any particular expression of them?
Lack of familiarity is probably the key difference between paper and elec-
tronic documents. We have had several centuries of fairly widespread and more
recently universal literacy to learn what makes documents trustworthy and how to
8 Lawrence Lessig, Code and other laws of cyberspace (2000) online: <http://code-is-
law.org/>, and second edition Codev2 (2006) online: <http://codev2.cc/>; Joel
Reidenberg, “Governing Networks and Cyberspace Rulemaking” (1996) 45 Emory
Law Journal 911, online: Social Science Research Network
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=11459>.
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build systems — verification systems and document handling procedures — to in-
crease that feature. We do not know as much about e-communications, and the
technology is evolving so quickly that what we knew a few years ago may not be
valid any more. The result is some nervousness, especially with the constant news
of threats, breaches, malware, and so on in both private and public sectors. It is not
surprising that people appeal to law to help.
V. TRUST AND THE LAW
How was the law asked to help restore and underpin trust, and how did it, and
how should it? These questions will occupy me for the rest of this article.
We should not forget (building on Schneier’s list mentioned above) that a lot
of law of general application contributes to trust and arguably is intended to pro-
mote trust. One thinks of the criminal law (from anti-theft to safe driving rules) but
also of regulatory law, aiming to protect us from harmful pharmaceuticals and bad
meat and to promote trusted standards in education.
We should also keep in mind enabling legislation that ensures legal effect to
certain kinds of civil activity. We expect that our rights will be meaningful and
enforceable, and deal with more confidence with people because of that expecta-
tion. However, as Surowiecki says, surely correctly: “the measure of success of
laws and contracts is how rarely they are invoked.”9
Let us take a quick look at how the law affects trust now in commercial mat-
ters, since e-commerce is much of my theme. At present, and for communications
in any medium, the law puts the risk of invalidity, of unreliability, of fraud, on the
person who relies on the communication. That person has to bear his, her, or its
losses unless he, she, or it can prove that someone else was responsible for the
mistake or fraud — and even then the negligent party or the rogue may not be
available or in a position to compensate for the loss.
The law does provide some rules to help raise the level of assurance, i.e. trust,
in the communications used in transactions. It may require such communications,
in order to be legally effective, to be in certain forms. For example, it may be that a
document must be in writing, like a guarantee or a land transfer (until recently at
least) or a notice of a rent increase. One does not have to trust to memory, one has a
written record. It may be that a document must be signed to be effective against the
person who signs, again like a guarantee or perhaps an application for a benefit.
One does not have simply to allege that a document came from or was agreed to by
a person; that person has left an identifiable mark on the document. It may be that
the law will give effect to a document only if it is an original, and not a copy, in
order to reduce the risk of forgery.
Could electronic communications be used to fulfill these legal form require-
ments? It appeared that these rules to create trust in the paper world would serve as
legal barriers to the development of electronic commerce.
The early attempts to get around these perceived barriers were in private law,
through contracts. Businesses that set up systems for electronic data interchange
would enter into “trading partner agreements” that set out how the communications
would work, who was responsible for what, and when they were to be considered
9 Surowiecki, supra note 2 at 124.
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reliable enough to act on. The agreements usually provided that the e-communica-
tions would be considered in writing and often signed as well, where the law re-
quired such matters.10
Other methods of building trust were for parties to post the terms of their con-
tracts, or the choice of relevant law, on web sites by way of making it clear what
they considered the binding rules. Some merchants operated within defined systems
that set out known rules for their members. One thinks of credit cards, whose issu-
ers developed rules for “card not present” transactions that were created for phone
orders but that became very important in online sales. Industry-wide voluntary
codes or standards also were developed to provide a trusted framework for e-com-
merce. The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI/DSS) is a promi-
nent current example, to reduce the risk of the loss of personal data used in credit
card transactions.11
While these methods were successful to some extent, there was always some
doubt whether parties could by contract draft around requirements that were set out
by statute. Agreeing that a computer communication was in writing did not neces-
sarily satisfy the legal rule. Even more open to doubt were private agreements on
what was admissible in evidence, given that the courts and judges are jealous of
their independence in making such decisions. More was needed to remove the bar-
riers, while maintaining the level of trust in business transactions that the require-
ments served.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
came to the rescue with its Model Law on Electronic Commerce, adopted in
1996.12 The Model Law was implemented in many countries.13 It is the leading
global standard and has done much to facilitate worldwide e-commerce, especially
business-to-business (B2B). In Canada, the common law provinces and the territo-
10 Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, Section of Business Law, American Bar
Association, “Model Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner Agreement” (1990)
45 The Business Lawyer 1645, and EDI Council of Canada, Model Form of Electronic
Data Interchange Trading Partner Agreement and Commentary (Toronto, 1990). See
A. H. Boss, “Electronic Data Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting Towards a
Global Environment” (1992) Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business
31 at 58, online: Northwestern Law
<http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1349&con
text=njilb>.
11 Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council, Data Security Standards, online:
<https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/>.
12 Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law. GA Res. 51/162, UN GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. 17, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/162 (1997), online: United Nations
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf> [U.N.
Model Law on Electronic Commerce].
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ries all have some variant of the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act14 designed to
implement the Model Law, and Quebec has its own statute still consistent with the
Model Law’s principles.15
These statutes helped create trust that e-communications could satisfy the le-
gal form requirements that had been imposed on a world that dealt only with paper.
They did so by establishing “functional equivalents” to the paper-based rules,
methods by which an electronic record could perform the same legal policy func-
tion as the paper record and thus be held to satisfy the same rule — and create the
same degree of trust. Thus an electronic document could satisfy the requirement
that something be in writing if it were “accessible so as to be usable for subsequent
reference”.16 The function of the writing requirement was to serve as memory of
the information in the document, so if the information was accessible for subse-
quent reference, that function had been served. One did not have to trust to human
memory; a computer’s memory would serve just as a paper record did.
In the same way, UNCITRAL decided that the reason to require an original
document was to help assure its integrity, that it had not been altered since put into
its final form. An electronic document that could provide reasonable assurances of
its integrity could thus perform the same function and meet the requirement for an
original. What was reasonable in such an assurance depended on the
circumstances.17
The operation became a little harder in deciding how to satisfy a signature
requirement. The analysis really raised a new question: what is a signature? People
had thought that they knew the answer until e-signatures came along to complicate
things. Some of the new questions:
• How is a signature linked to a person? It used to be that it came from a
pen at the end of the person’s arm.
• Is the question whether a document is signed (for the purpose of a law
requiring a signature) distinct from the question of who signed it? Can
one answer “Yes” to the first question but “I don’t know” to the second?
• Does a signature attest to the integrity of the signed document? Common
lawyers and civil lawyers had vigorous debates on that question at
UNCITRAL.
• Does the legal effect of a signature depend on how reliable it is? To this
question, we now turn.
14 Uniform Electronic Commerce Act (Consolidation 2011), online: Uniform Law Con-
ference of Canada <http://ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-new-order/older-uniform-acts/703-
electronic-commerce/1793-uniform-electronic-commerce-act-consol-2011>.
15 Act to create a legal framework for information technologies, C.Q.L.R. C C-1.1, on-
line: CanLII <http://canlii.ca/en/qc/laws/stat/cqlr-c-c-1.1/latest/cqlr-c-c-1.1.html>.
16 U.N. Model Law on Electronic Commerce, supra note 12 at art 6.
17 Ibid. at art 8
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The function of a signature was to associate a person (or legal entity) with the
information in the document.18 Almost any method of doing that electronically
might be adequate if an intention to sign could be found. But UNCITRAL was
apparently concerned that “any” method might not replace the trust that the signa-
ture requirement was intended to create. The Model Law therefore went on to re-
quire that the signing method be “as reliable as appropriate in the circumstances”,
including among the circumstances that the parties to a document had agreed on
how it should be signed electronically.19
Here, in my view, UNCITRAL went too far, and a number of legislators
around the world went too far in copying it.20 The UECA does not include the
reliability test for signatures, for a number of reasons.
For one thing, the common law does not require a signature to be in any par-
ticular form. The written name of the signer is a standard signature, but an unread-
able scrawl may also be a signature, though it needs outside evidence to show it is
the signer’s mark. An X on a piece of paper (or some even flimsier material) can be
a signature. A person may sign by someone else: if I ask my assistant to sign my
name on a contract or cheque, that is my signature not my assistant’s, though there
will be questions of proof if anyone questions it. Case law has held that a typed
name or even a printed letterhead can be a signature for some purposes.
As a result of this flexibility, a very strong argument can be made that an
electronic signature is already a valid signature, and no law reform was needed.
The Law Commission of England and Wales came to this conclusion in 2001,21 so
no extra reliability standard was needed.
In any event, the range of handwritten signatures clearly extends from very
reliable to not very reliable formats — but the law does not require reliability. In
some cases it may impose special rules, as with wills that need two signatures of
people present at the same time as witnesses, but in general, as noted earlier, the
law deals with reliability by allocating risk to the person who is asked to rely on the
signature. It’s up to the relying party to decide if the signature is acceptable. The
same test can apply to electronic as to ink-on-paper signatures.
A reliability test moves the time of the decision about the validity of a signa-
ture from the time the document is signed to the time a judge reviews it in court and
decides if it was reliable enough for the purpose. The judge is not necessarily more
expert or better able to make that decision than the parties, and in the meantime the
law that was supposed to inspire trust has created uncertainty instead.
18 Christopher Reed, “What is a Signature?” (2000) 3 Journal of Information Law and
Technology, online: University of Warwick
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/reed/>.
19 U.N. Model Law on Electronic Commerce, supra note 12 at art 7.
20 A general discussion of the point can be found in John D. Gregory, “Must E-Signatures
be Reliable?” (2013) 10 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 67,
online: Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review
<http://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/2024/1961>.
21 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Trans-
actions: Advice from the Law Commission (December 2001) at para. 3.39, online: Law
Commission
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/Electronic_Commerce_Advice_Paper.pdf>.
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Finally, having an external standard like reliability gives parties in bad faith,
or strangers to the transaction like a trustee in bankruptcy or the tax authorities, a
chance to break a contract based on that standard. Despite knowing who signed a
document and what document was signed, such a person might successfully chal-
lenge a contract on the ground that the electronic signature was not sufficiently
reliable for the importance of the transaction.22 The reliability test becomes a trap
for the unwary rather than a source of trust.
In 2005 UNCITRAL adopted the Convention on the Use of Electronic Com-
munications in International Contracts, the E-Communications Convention.23 The
Convention reproduces in binding form many of the rules found in the Model Law.
However, for signatures, UNCITRAL was persuaded to add an alternative to the
reliability test: that the relying party has shown the origin of the document and the
intention of its originator with respect to it.24 In other words, reliability in fact can
replace reliability in the abstract (even if the abstract test was “in the
circumstances”).
Both of these tests aim to ensure the association of the signer with the record.
The policy is the same, the means are quite different. In general in this article, I am
not advocating differences in policy. I do not deny that trust is important or that
security is important. The article is about legislative means to those ends.
VI. TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY — OR NOT
Electronic signatures present an opportunity to consider a different approach
to supporting trust by law. A number of people believed that the reliability test of
the Model Law was not sufficiently strong. In other words they did not want to
remove or amend that test, as I suggested a moment ago — a reasoning accepted by
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada and the Uniform Law Commission in the
United States as well.25 They wanted to add to it, or at least define reliability more
precisely. Looking at it more broadly, it can be said that they wanted not just to
22 Less frequently, a court may hold an e-signature to be sufficiently reliable even when
the party to the transaction has decided it is not, thus compelling the party to engage in
a relationship it does not trust. Getup Ltd v. Electoral Commissioner, [2010] FCA
(Australia) 869. For more details, see my case comment on Slaw, online: Lawyers,
Engineers and Technology: A Case Study <http://www.slaw.ca/2014/05/01/electronic-
signatures-and-election-registration-case-comment-on-getup-ltd-v-electoral-commis-
sioner-australia/>
23 United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International
Contracts. GA Res. 60/21, UN GAOR, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/21 (2007), on-
line with Explanatory Note: United Nations
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/06-57452_Ebook.pdf> [Electronic
Communications Convention].
24 Ibid. at art 9(3)(b), “The method is either . . . (ii) Proven in fact to have fulfilled the
functions described in subparagraph (a) above, by itself or together with further
evidence.”
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remove barriers but to promote the use of electronic communications, and they
were prepared to regulate to do so — to create the trust they felt was missing.
There are two main approaches to this attempt: the technology-neutral ap-
proach, where the functions or goals or characteristics are recited without saying
how technically to achieve them; and the technology-specific approach, which re-
quires the use of particular technologies to ensure trustworthiness. The Model Law
on Electronic Commerce is resolutely technology-neutral.
Let us look by way of contrast at UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Electronic
Signatures, which was adopted in 2001 after several years of development.26 The
discussions on this second Model Law had two points of focus: what were the legal
elements of reliability, and what were the consequences of achieving reliability as
defined by law?27
A common formulation of the technology-neutral but prescriptive characteris-
tics of an electronic signature is a four-part test originally developed by the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology in the US and reproduced in essence
in many statutes around the world. Here is the version used in the Model Law on
Electronic Signatures: 
Article 6.3. An electronic signature is considered to be reliable for the pur-
pose of satisfying the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 [to be as relia-
ble as appropriate in the circumstances] if:
(a) The signature creation data are, within the context in which
they are used, linked to the signatory and to no other person;
(b) The signature creation data were, at the time of signing,
under the control of the signatory and of no other person;
(c) Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time
of signing, is detectable; and
(d) Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to
provide assurance as to the integrity of the information to which
it relates, any alteration made to that information after the time of
signing is detectable.
A very similar recital occurs in the Electronic Documents section of Canada’s fed-
eral legislation, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA).28
Legal systems that set out these requirements generally describe a legal result
for meeting them. In other words, they spell out what can be trusted about them.
26 Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment 2001. GA Res. 56/80,
UN GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/80, online with Guide to Enactment:
United Nations <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/ml-elecsig-e.pdf>
[United Nations Model Law on Electronic Signatures].
27 The discussions can be found in the reports on the meetings of Working Group IV
(Electronic Commerce) between 1997 and 2001, online: United Nations
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/4Electronic_Comm
erce.html>.
28 S.C.2000 c. 5, online: Department of Justice <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-
8.6/FullText.html> [PIPED]. Subsection 48(2) authorizes regulations on “secure elec-
tronic signatures”. The Secure Electronic Signatures Regulation, SOR/2005-30, is on-
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Put in their best light, the rules allow participants in a transaction to preserve trust
because they do not need to go behind the security system (the drafters hope, in any
event). They would not have to defend on substantive grounds against claims that
the message was wrong or even never sent. (I have written elsewhere about “the
myth of non-repudiation” and will not take up that topic here.29)
Thus the UN Model Law rules above are part of a description of the method
by which one satisfies electronically a legal requirement that information be signed.
If one has those characteristics, one satisfies the requirement (unless the contrary is
shown). Meeting similar requirements for an “advanced electronic signature” in the
EU Electronic Signature Directive makes the signature the legal equivalent of a
handwritten signature.30 This is the least that any such law produces. Using a “se-
cure electronic signature” under PIPEDA creates a presumption that the person pur-
porting to sign the document did sign it.31 Some laws presume that the signed doc-
ument has not been altered since it was signed, up to the point when the secure
signature was verified.
While these characteristics seem at first view to be helpful, they do not — in
my opinion — turn out to be as helpful as they are alleged to be. None of the char-
acteristics are all that solid. In particular, showing the link to an individual can be
very hard, if the individual did not personally confirm the signing data — and even
then, subject to what verification of identity? Systems that depend on third-party
certificates of the link need to demonstrate the reliability of their procedures, which
is surprisingly hard. One needs to put in evidence, at least in the face of a chal-
lenge, considerable detail about how one issues a certificate, how one verifies iden-
tity, how one deals with mistakes or changes, how one keeps the records secure.
Certification authorities tend to have very detailed certification practice statements.
If a signature relies on a series of certificates (one certification authority verifying
the signature of another), then these statements need to be compared to see if they
are consistent. Efforts have been made to standardize practices and the supporting
documentation, but they have not been widely successful.
The control of the individual over the signing device is also subject to ques-
tion. What of a malware attack? What of any unauthorized use without the knowl-
line: Department of Justice <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2005-
30/FullText.html>.
29 See John D. Gregory, “The Myth of Non-Repudiation”, Slaw.ca blog (July 2012) on-
line: Slaw <http://www.slaw.ca/2012/07/16/the-myth-of-non-repudiation>.
30 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, Official Journal [of the
European Union] L 013, 19/01/2000, p. 0012 — 0020, online: European Union Law
<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999L0093:en:HTML> [EU
E-Signature Directive]. See Article 5 for the legal effect.
31 See the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985 s. E.5 (as amended in 2000), s. 31.4, online:
Department of Justice <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-5/page-12.html>, for
the ability to create presumptions by regulation, and the Secure Electronic Signature
Regulations, supra note 28, s. 5 for this presumption.
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edge of the signer? How do we evaluate that risk?32 In addition, did the computer
actually send the message that the user intended to sign? How does one prove the
reliability of the technology?
The additional criteria about detecting alterations to the signed text seem to
rely on the use of hashing techniques usually associated with dual-key encryption
signatures33 and may not be technology-neutral at all.
In evaluating the impact of such e-signatures on trust, one must ask how sure
one is that the characteristics exist. We might question the detailed formulation on
its use of the word “assurance”. How sure does one have to be before one has
assurance? The question is similar to that posed regarding legal duties to “ensure”
that something happens. Ultimately for legal purposes it is a judge who has to be
sure, or who has to be persuaded that the degree of assurance attained was reasona-
ble. It is thus subject to the same problem as the original reliability test of the
Model Law on Electronic Commerce, that the parties cannot be confident in their
choice of signing method. A court may ultimately overrule them on technical
grounds.
Information security systems are frequently expressed as attaining particular
levels of assurance, which is to say that some assertions are surer than others. This
is not surprising or problematic, except when one alleges that one has created trust
by this legislation. What level of trust? If that question is still open, then perhaps
we should just ask it of the signature itself and all its surrounding circumstances,
and not of the signature’s compliance with these rules.
Although the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Signatures is framed in technol-
ogy-neutral language, a number of critics have thought that its requirements, espe-
cially those relating to the alteration of the signature or the signed document, can be
met only by a system using dual-key (or public/private key) encryption in a net-
work using trusted third parties to certify the signatories. In other words, it is a
technology-specific rule relying on a public key infrastructure (PKI). A signature
produced by such a system is usually called a “digital signature”, though that term
is unhelpfully also found as a generic synonym for any electronic signature.
It has been suggested that the partisans of technology-specific legislation have
come to the discussion from a review of the technology, rather than from a view of
removing barriers to e-commerce.34 Their analysis of the technology leads them to
seek a technological solution and often a regulatory solution to the vulnerabilities
32 Some of these questions are raised as well in my note on non-repudiation, supra note
29.
33 Dual-key (public key) cryptography is described at Wikipedia, “Public-key Cryptogra-
phy” online, Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography>. A
short note on hashing functions in context is provided at Key Management Infrastruc-
tures, “Frequently Asked Questions”, online: French National Department of Defence
<http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/archive/en/faq/faq_igc.html#5230>.
34 See for example Boss, “Searching for Security”, supra note 3 at 598ff; also C. Ellison
and B. Schneier, “Ten Risks of PKI: What You’re Not Being Told about Public Key
Infrastructure” (2000) 16 Computer Security Journal 1, online: Schneier on Security
<https://www.schneier.com/paper-pki.pdf>.
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they perceive.35 Their critics have sometimes alleged that PKI is a problem in
search of a solution.36
This is not the place to go into the details of how difficult it is to build a public
key infrastructure, especially for an open system where strangers might deal with
each other.37 Proving the elements of the specified technology is still difficult
too — not just the mathematics of digital signatures, but the whole system. Many
of the questions raised above with respect to technology-neutral systems arise again
for specific technology. If one assumes that the legislation specifying the technol-
ogy replaces the need for proof, because the legislature is satisfied that it works
appropriately, one is left instead with proving that one has used the right technol-
ogy in the right way.
The European Union issued a Directive on Electronic Signatures in 1999 that
set out criteria like those in the Model Law on E-Signatures, with very detailed
requirements for “qualified certificates” linking owners of signature creation de-
vices to their signatures, and for the issuers of those certificates.38 It has turned out
in practice that businesses have not relied as heavily as expected on the “advanced
electronic signatures” so produced. It may be harder to show that a particular signa-
ture meets all the technical criteria than it is to show who signed the document in
fact.
The attempt to legislate trust in this way cannot be said to have succeeded.
It is an open question how to avoid having the legislative “approval” of good
security technology itself turn into a barrier to commercial trust. This is a question
to which I do not claim to have definitive answers.
VII. TRUST AND LIABILITY
It may be of interest, however, to look briefly at one element of much
of this legislation that aims at an aspect of trust we have not yet reviewed:
liability of the participants.
Liability can be seen as an “institutional” support for trust. Liability
rules ensure that someone takes on the burden of making things work in a
trustworthy way or pays the cost of remedying a failure of trust. Liability
rules can be efficient or disruptive. Do they put the burden of trustworthi-
ness on the party best able to bear it, or to insure against it? Can the parties
allocate the liability among themselves fairly, by contract?
As noted earlier, under our general law, the relying party takes the risk
of loss from a forged or unprovable signature or document. One of the char-
35 For a discussion of the different approaches of lawyers and engineers, see my Slaw
column, online: Lawyers, Engineers and Technology: A Case Study
<http://www.slaw.ca/2011/08/25/lawyers-engineers-and-technology-a-case-study/>.
36 Jane K Winn, “The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth about Digital Signa-
tures and Electronic Commerce” (2001) 37 Idaho Law Review 353 at fn 4.
37 See for example Ellison and Schneier, supra note 35 at 1; C. Kaner, “The Insecurity of
the Digital Signature” (1997), online: Bad Software
<http://www.badsoftware.com/digsig.htm>.
38 EU E-Signature Directive, supra note 30.
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acteristics of the attempt to be more prescriptive about electronic signatures
is that it sometimes shifts that burden. I mentioned a moment ago the pre-
sumptions of attribution and sometimes of integrity of the signed document
that have accompanied “secure electronic signatures”. Some such systems
go further and make the person who controls a signature creation device
(which could simply be the person’s computer) liable for documents signed
with a digital signature certified to come from that person. The State of
Utah was a pioneer in such statutes in the United States; its Digital Signa-
ture Act of 1995 had such a provision, though only where the certificate was
issued by a licensed certification authority regulated by the State.39
In other words, the government was intervening actively in the market
for signatures in order to promote e-commerce, to the extent of assigning
liability for private actions. The problem was that it was hard to ensure that
even a regulated certification authority would get all its verification and en-
rollment procedures right, and that the user of the signing device would
avoid all attacks on the computer, including from malware such as keylog-
gers and trojans. Though the mathematics of dual-key encryption is impres-
sive, the signing is usually done by a computer accessed with a simple user
name and password, and such systems can be very insecure. One skeptic
said of the Utah system that he expected to see the headline “grandmother
chooses weak password, loses house”.40
Without such an assignment of liability, however, the business model
of an open PKI did not make much sense. Without it, the liability normally
on the relying party would focus on the third party who certified the identity
of the signer. If that identification failed, to the loss of the relying party,
then lawsuits would follow. Attempts were made to design PKI systems so
that there was a contract between the relying party and the certification au-
thority, so that the latter could limit its liability by agreement. Such at-
tempts have not been very successful. As a result, not many private bodies
have wanted to be in the certification business for high-value transactions.
If the model did “work”, in that the allocation of liability resisted at-
tacks both legal and popular, it is still subject to the criticism that it distorts
the market to support a single technology. The distortion works in two ways
(at least). First, it pushes technical innovation down the path that gets the
prescribed legal benefits, and discourages innovation in what might be more
fruitful but legally unrecognized directions. Second, it puts liability on par-
39 Utah Digital Signature Act, Utah Code ss. 46-3-101 to 46-3-504 (1995), enacted by
Utah Laws 2005 c 61, s 46-3-401ff online: Universita Degli Studi Di Trento
<http://www.jus.unitn.it/users/pascuzzi/privcomp97-98/docu-
mento/firma/utah/udsa.html>. The Act was repealed in 2000 and replaced by a version
of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, supra note 25.
40 See C. Bradford Biddle, “Comment: Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature
Act and Liability Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure” (1996) 33 San Diego L.R.
1143.
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ties least able to bear it or to avoid it, compared to the general law, and
requires a heavy regulatory hand to make it work.
One may compare the allocation of damage for loss of credit cards to
the card issuers and not the card holders. The result is that the issuers create
many verification systems based on typical use, source of claims, and so on,
that individual holders would not be able to replicate.41 Such a system is not
easy to create for authentication systems generally.
In short, statutory allocation of liability as described for digital signa-
tures legislates the winners of a competition that should be left to the mar-
ket to sort out.42 Governments do not know this kind of thing any better.
Governments may help compensate for “market failure”, but we do not
have market failure in the world of e-signatures or e-commerce — consider
the billions of dollars of transactions online, large and small, every day.
Those numbers were there, though smaller, in the late 1990s when these
attempts were first made. People are relying on electronic communications
and they are right to do so.
One may conclude that the attempt to create trust in e-commerce
through technology-specific legislation has not been a good idea. Part of the
problem has been that commercial law is generally enabling and remedial,
not promotional or regulatory. Commercial law rarely tries to lead commer-
cial practice, because it does not want to restrict business innovation. Fo-
cusing on the technology from the start risks creating technology law, not
commercial law, and the trust problem is not properly addressed.
Requiring PKI for commercial transactions has certainly not suc-
ceeded. PKI has its uses, however. It works fairly well in closed systems
(such as within governments, or between some banks and their customers)
with substantial administrative capacity. It also works well in supporting the
secure socket layer (SSL) system for secure access to web sites. This sys-
tem works because the Internet browsers like Chrome and Safari and
Firefox build in recognized certificates that identify web sites, and address-
ing those sites invokes the certificates. SSL can be beaten, but it has worked
satisfactorily so far.43
41 The liabilities in the credit card system have been allocated for some time, and the
market lives with them. The advent of mobile payments is upsetting this market be-
cause there are a multitude of possible payment providers — telecom companies, de-
vice manufacturers, and others beyond the credit card world — and their relationships
are still fluid and competitive, so the “right” allocation of liability is not known. Thus
how the whole system will develop trust in its users remains to be seen.
42 C. Bradford Biddle, “Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws and the
Electronic Commerce Marketplace” (1997) 34 San Diego L.R. 1225.
43 This statement was written before the recent Heartbleed defect was known:
<http://heartbleed.com/>. It has caused major trauma to a number of security experts:
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed>.
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I have submitted to this point that attempts to legislate trust have not
succeeded in electronic commerce, whether through: technology-neutral
laws like the Model Law on Electronic Signatures (not implemented in
Canada and the US, by and large — the part of Quebec’s framework statute
that most closely tracks the MLES has not really been implemented in the
past decade); or the EU Directive; or technology-specific laws like the digi-
tal signature legislation in Utah and in several countries that adopted similar
legislation at the same time (Germany, Italy, and Malaysia come to mind).
Some countries enacted “hybrid” legislation, removing barriers to gen-
eral e-communications and providing special treatment for especially trust-
worthy technology. Singapore is a leading example,44 but there are others;
to the extent that the EU Directive prohibited discrimination against ordi-
nary e-signatures, it might be considered a hybrid as well. The question is
whether there has been wide use of the secure signature techniques among
unrelated parties, as the “promise” of PKI was to enable trusted high-value
commerce among strangers. I have seen little evidence of such use.
VIII. OTHER SOURCES OF TRUST (SOMETIMES SUPPORTED
BY LEGISLATION)
I would submit that the mistake in trying to legislate trust is to conceive of
trust as an element of legal validity. It is not, or it should not be. A valid transaction
need have no different features in e-commerce than in offline deals: a common
understanding of the subject and the price and a common intention to contract. The
form has nothing to do with it.
Similarly, the form of a signature has nothing to do with its legal effect, for
handwritten as for electronic signatures. One needs context to make that judgment,
context with legal content. So laws that apply only to form may miss their legal
mark and not create the trust they aim for.
That does not mean that trust is unimportant, or that security can be ignored.
Using e-communications may be valid in law, but is it prudent? What are the risks?
What is the cost of reducing the risks to an acceptable level? How much assurance
does one need before transacting? As a matter of legal validity and as a matter of
trust, an electronic transaction should not need to be more reliable than its offline
equivalent. The question is who determines that level of reliability and how.
While parties to commercial transactions need to have a degree of trust, it is
up to them to decide if they have it or not. There are many non-legislative, non-
legislatable sources of trust: personal relationships; a history of prior dealings; and
diverse elements of evidence of identity, intention, or quality. Identity is often
much less relevant to a transaction than solvency, for example. All of these factors
apply just as much online as offline.
44 Singapore, Electronic Transactions Act (2010) Statutes of Singapore c 88 (originally
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Looking strictly at the media of communications, it is possible to verify an
electronic message by way of a phone call or fax. It is a general principle that one
cannot establish trust in a channel of communication through that same channel.
That would be the equivalent of saying, “trust me because I assure you that you
can.” What is the “level of assurance” of such a statement? Legislation that has
purported to make a single communication trustworthy, for example by defining it
as reliable, has turned out to need outside evidence of reliability when the original
attribution has been challenged.
Another major way to develop trust is by the involvement of third parties —
not as free-standing providers of identification services, as in the open PKI model,
but as part of their usual activities. For example, one of the main reasons that busi-
ness to consumer (B2C) e-commerce exists is because of the role of the credit card
companies and the financial institutions that issue the cards. Merchants really do
not care much who they sell goods or services to, if they get paid. The card issuer
has an identity-based relationship with the card holder/consumer, so the merchant
does not have to. The card issuers identify by proxy, but they really stand behind
the solvency of the customer.
Another area where proxies can be important is with student loans. Student
loan authorities wonder how they can enroll a student online, i.e. without ever see-
ing him or her in person. It is admittedly easy to deal electronically once one has
met the applicant in person; one can issue him or her authentication codes that
allow e-communications and electronic funds transfers. The hard part is in knowing
who someone is in the first place: “On the Internet, no one knows you’re a
deadbeat.”
The California student loan system solves this problem by farming out both
identification and payment. A student who needs a loan has to have an identifier
from an eligible educational institution and also an account with an approved finan-
cial institution. If both institutions acknowledge the applicant’s status, then the gov-
ernment loan office can safely trust that identification. The process is made even
safer by making the payments only to the educational institution, with the balance
if any paid directly to the bank. As a result, there is very little incentive for an
ineligible person to try to scam the system: there is just not much money lying
around loose.
Note how trust is developed here through a kind of network, and how the
payment rules supplement the trust network to reduce the risk of trusting. The prox-
ies involved may be in the private or the public sector. Here there is an interaction.
There may be legislation approving this system, but more for the purpose of author-
ization than to prescribe the levels of assurance.
A notable example of the use of proxy identifier is in a scheme currently being
proposed by the Government Digital Service, part of the Cabinet Office in the
United Kingdom.45 It has been working to create a means by which citizens can
identify themselves electronically to government in order to take advantage of a
wide range of government services, without creating a national identity card or a
45 A selection of news items about the progress of this project is online: Government
Digital Service <http://digital.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/category/id-assurance/>.
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single sign-on identifier. Such all-access tokens or cards have tended to cause great
concern among privacy advocates, especially in common-law countries.
The Service is proposing instead that the government will accept authentica-
tion (log-in) by means of accounts they have with non-governmental organizations,
including social media. So one might be able to request a government service by
using your name and log-in information from Facebook or your bank. Those insti-
tutions will not know why the government wants the authentication information, so
they do not know what their members are doing with the government. There will be
standards of security imposed for institutions to qualify to participate in the pro-
gram.46 This is one example of a phenomenon known as “federated identity man-
agement,” in which evidence of identity from a set of more-or-less linked sources
(a federation) is used to authenticate people for access to particular systems.47
The Government Digital Service describes this system as “less about identity,
more about trust.” This is an important observation: e-communications are teaching
providers of goods and services what they really need to know about the people
they deal with, and what can just as easily be set aside or provided in another form.
Governments are making the same discoveries, with pressure from the privacy
advocates.
One sees the use of proxies for enforcement of digital rights as well. One
much-discussed example is the effort to make Internet Service Providers (ISPs) lia-
ble for defamation or copyright infringement on the part of their subscribers (or
even for messages that pass through these intermediaries), or for content that they
host. Some of these efforts have been based on the common law, but statutes have
been advocated for or passed to make the ISPs serve as data storage points or even
as police. Consider the “three strikes” laws against copyright infringement that re-
quire ISPs to give notice of alleged infringement to subscribers and to cut off their
Internet service after three (alleged) infractions. To the extent that content owners
want a “trusted” Internet, such legislation aims to increase it.48
46 It is not likely that one’s Facebook credentials will meet the ultimate standards, but an
e-banking authentication might do so.
47 Federated identity management is described on Wikipedia, “Federated Identity”, on-
line: Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federated_identity_management>. Cana-
dian government initiatives are described at Federating Identity Management in the
Government of Canada: A Backgrounder, online: Treasury Board of Canada Secreta-
riat <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/sim-gsi/docs/2011/fimgc-fgigc/fimgc-fgigc03-eng.asp>.
The government of British Columbia has been working on the topic for some years,
with the most recent development being the BC Service Card. The initiatives are on-
line: Provincial Identity Information Management System, online: Office of the Chief
Information Officer <http://www.cio.gov.bc.ca/cio/idim/index.page>. The American
Bar Association has a task force on the topic whose site links to a number of interesting
documents: Cyberspace Law: Identity Management Legal Task Force, online: Ameri-
can Bar Association
<http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL320041>.
48 A collection of articles on such laws, also known as “graduated response” laws, is
found on TechDirt — not a neutral observer, but its news items are likely to be accu-
rate: http://www.techdirt.com/blog/?tag=three+strikes. It may be that such laws are be-
coming less attractive to legislators.
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This example — not really drawn from commercial law, though commercial
interests are at stake — shows that trust is not evenly distributed across our society
or our economy. One person’s “trusted computing” (a Microsoft phrase) is another
person’s spyware, or interference with assumed rights.
Regulators also focus on intermediaries to generate an effect they can trust. In
Canada, the Copyright Appeal Board and the Supreme Court of Canada have held
that ISPs are not broadcasters for allowing access to content, though copyright
owners would have liked to have them as a pressure point (or cash flow point) for
their interests.49 However, legislation requires ISPs (among others) to report any
instances of child pornography they find, in order to create trust in the safety of the
system.50
Similarly, in the US, Congress exempted intermediaries from any liability for
content that originated with a third party, because they were such attractive
targets.51 This protective legislation reminds us of the connection between trust and
liability mentioned earlier: imposing liability would inspire conduct of the kind the
plaintiffs wanted and wanted to be able to trust. Protective legislation was based on
the principle that increasing unhampered Internet activity was more important than
the values promoted by imposing liability for the content of messages transported
by the intermediaries.
IX. LEGISLATING THE TRUSTED FRAMEWORK VS.
LEGISLATING THE TRUSTED TRANSACTION
If we want our electronic marketplace to move from mistrust to confidence,
has legislation any role? Is there no middle governmental ground between the
Criminal Code or Sale of Goods Act and the digital signature statutes that appear to
be a bad idea? I think that there is. I am not going to describe such legislation in
detail here; I have not written any (yet). I am going to point to a few key considera-
tions for its design, and describe briefly a few promising initiatives.
I submit that the legislatures should be aiming at creating a legal framework
for trust, rather than trying to govern the trusted transaction itself. Since trust, as I
said at the outset, is a judgment resulting from an analysis of risk, there can be
ways to affect the amount of risk in the system and the allocation of risk, without
requiring the use of any technology or imposing mandatory liability. The latter ties
the hands of people who may have many reasons to prefer risk to certainty (to some
49 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) v. Canadian
Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, online: Supreme Court of Canada
<http://scc-csc.lexum.com/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2159/index.do>.
50 The federal and Manitoba legislation are found at Mandatory Reporting, online: Cana-
dian Centre for Child Protection (Cybertip), <https://www.cybertip.ca/app/en/projects-
mandatory_reporting>. That site does not currently note the Ontario and Alberta stat-
utes on the same topic.
51 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 1996, online: Legal Information In-
stitute <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230>. A useful explanation of the
legislation is provided by the Electronic Frontier Foundation “Section 230 Protections”
Legal Guide for Bloggers, online: Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<https://www.eff.org/issues/bloggers/legal/liability/230>.
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extent that is true of any entrepreneur) and who should be presumed to be compe-
tent to evaluate their risk at the transactional level.
One can look at legislative tools that operate on the civil law side (what is
valid? what is effective?), the criminal side (what is prohibited?) and the regulatory
side (how are things to be done?). One can decide who should be the subject, or
target, of such laws: parties to transactions, intermediaries, proxies, businesses,
consumers, or government. Should one impose obligations directly or enact incen-
tives to desirable behavior? Should the rules be made at a provincial, national, or
even international level?
Jeffrey Ritter, a pioneer in e-commerce law and in building trustworthy sys-
tems for business, has noted that “the posse has to stop at the river” — in other
words, there are limits to what a national authority can do in the world of electronic
communications, and international collaboration may be best.52 Indeed it is not a
coincidence that one finds the intellectual leadership in e-commerce law at the in-
ternational level, in UNCITRAL and elsewhere. The European Union has set world
standards in privacy law, though as noted earlier, its first efforts on electronic sig-
natures did not have the expected success. So consistency with the best interna-
tional thinking is nearly mandatory these days in this field.
X. STANDARDS
Besides legislation, lawmakers can encourage development of and compliance
with standards and guidelines, private or public. Sometimes such documents be-
come mandatory over time. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) published Fair Information Practice “guidelines”53 in 1980 that lie
at the heart of most privacy legislation around the world. The Canadian Standard
Association’s Model Privacy Code became the core of Canada’s federal privacy
legislation, along with “substantially similar” provincial laws in several
provinces.54
Regulations under the Income Tax Act give preferential status to taxpayers’
electronic records that comply with the Canadian General Standards Board’s Stan-
dard for Electronic Records as Electronic Evidence, and for some purposes the reg-
ulations require compliance with that standard.55 The role of the law of evidence in
52 Private correspondence with the author. See online: <http://jeffreyritter.com> and Rit-
ter, J., Building Digital Trust (forthcoming).
53 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data (1980), online: OECD,
<http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyand
transborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm>. The guidelines were updated in 2013. The ad-
dress here contains a link to the revised version.
54 The Code is Schedule 1 to PIPEDA, supra note 28. Quebec, Alberta and British Co-
lumbia have statutes designated as substantially equivalent, and Manitoba has recently
passed legislation that is likely also to be designated.
55 Canada Revenue Agency, “Books and Records Retention/Destruction”, Information
Circular IC78-10R5, para 17–23, online: Canada Revenue Agency <http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/ic78-10r5/ic78-10r5-10e.pdf>. See also Canada Revenue Agency
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promoting trust in e-communications is a fascinating topic, though beyond the
scope of the present discussion.
Some of the opposition to legislated cybersecurity rules in the United States
has pointed to the array of existing standards to which businesses have bound them-
selves.56 However, the variety of such standards definitely raises the question
whether some mandatory minimum should be prescribed by law, even if the con-
tent remains flexible in some way. One could have a legislative guide for the mini-
mum contents of security standards, or require adherence to some standard without
saying to which, or combine rules to compel adherence to a standard that meets the
legislated minimum content. If there is a single principle here, it is that one size
does not fit all. One has to tailor the solution to the problem, and understand the
problem correctly before starting the tailoring.
XI. APPROACHES
That said, some common approaches seem from experience more promising
than others. One of them is “media neutrality” — having the same rule for the same
phenomenon regardless of the medium in which it appears: paper or electronic, and
within the electronic world. That is why the definition of “electronic signature” in
the Canadian and American uniform e-commerce statutes refers to data in elec-
tronic form used with “intention to sign”.57 The use of the traditional word was
deliberate: there was not one legal act of signing on paper and another for elec-
tronic media. There was one signature at all.
Another promising approach is “technology neutrality”, already discussed.
The more specific the reference to a technological solution, the more likely that
solution is to be out of date almost before the law can be enforced. That does not
mean that the law cannot address particular problems caused by specific technol-
ogy, but the more general its language can be, the less likely one is to create loop-
holes that new technology with similar problems can slip through. UNCITRAL’s
Model Law on Electronic Signatures was intended as a technology-neutral frame-
work, but for reasons given earlier has not widely been considered a success. PKI
generally is not a technology-neutral system, though it is normally a system frame-
work rather than transactional in focus.
If one is focusing on a middle level between national policy and the transac-
tion, i.e. on a system, then one is more likely to prescribe or encourage a process
than a result. One intends that trust in the system will increase as a result of the
legislation, but without prescribing that it must. An example of this on which a lot
of work is now being done, both here in Canada and internationally, is online dis-
pute resolution (ODR). UNCITRAL has a working group that has been meeting
“Electronic Recordkeeping”, Information Circular IC05-1R1, online: Canada Revenue
Agency <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/ic05-1r1/ic05-1r1-10e.pdf>.
56 Jody Westby, “Rockefeller Admits Congress Lacks Foundation for Cybersecurity Leg-
islation”, Forbes (1 October 2012) online: Forbes
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/10/01/rockefeller-admits-congress-
lacks-foundation-for-cybersecurity-legislation/>.
57 Uniform Electronic Commerce Act, supra note 14 at s 1(b) and the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act, supra note 25 at 2(8).
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since 2010 on the topic.58 The group is likely to adopt a set of procedural rules for
resolving B2B and B2C small-value but high-volume disputes. The highest-profile
Canadian project is British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal, to become active
in 2014.59
Having a good ODR system will promote e-commerce because people will
have confidence that if things go wrong, there is a remedy. I mentioned at the out-
set of this article that “security systems” could enhance trust even if they worked
retroactively. ODR in fact would not be strictly retroactive, since the relationship
between the parties is not over until after the ODR has done its work. ODR is a
combination of technology and law, and UNCITRAL is considering elements of
both. They may be joined eventually by simplified rules of substantive law, again
to increase confidence of the parties that their transactions will not be bogged down
in foreign legal complexities but that expectations will be met.
A recent Working Paper for the UNCITRAL ODR project adds some fascinat-
ing possibilities to this topic.60 It canvasses “private enforcement mechanisms” that
might be part of an ODR system to operate outside the formal court system. Some
create an incentive for the parties to conform with the results of a mediation or
recommended solution. Others “automate” compliance with the outcome. The in-
centives discussed are ratings systems and “trustmarks,” the former generated by
users of the ODR service (or e-commerce site) to give their opinion of their experi-
ence, the latter generated by some neutral institution that evaluates compliance ac-
cording to published standards. The paper raises some practical questions about
how such systems might be made to work in an ODR e-commerce system.61 It goes
on to canvass very briefly a number of more “radical and holistic” approaches to
incentives that could see a non-compliant merchant lose its domain name, be put on
a black list, have its payment facility (e.g. PayPal or Amazon) be suspended, or
lose membership in a business association. These methods would depend on some
third-party involvement, and it is not currently clear how third parties might be
persuaded to get involved in an international compliance system for this purpose.62
The automated compliance mechanisms would restore money to the successful
customer from a merchant who did not comply with a settlement or recommenda-
tion (in the context of ODR that is not legally binding in the sense of enforceable
through the courts.) The two methods discussed are chargebacks through credit
58 UNICTRAL Working Group III, Online Dispute Resolution, online: United Nations
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/working_groups/3Online_Dispute_Reso
lution.html>.
59 Attorney General of British Columbia, Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, online: Ministry
of Justice <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/legislation/civil-resolution-tribunal-act/>. See also
John D. Gregory, “Canadian Initiatives in Online Dispute Resolution” (September
2012), online: http://www.euclid.ca/Korea_ODR_2012.pdf.
60 UNCITRAL Working Group III, supra note 58, “Online dispute resolution for cross-
border electronic commerce transactions: overview of private enforcement mecha-
nisms”, Working Paper 124 prepared for the November 2013 meeting
(A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.124.).
61 Ibid. at paras. 17–26.
62 Ibid. at paras. 27–29.
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card issuers and escrow accounts. Both methods are known in some regions of the
world and not so much in others. They too would usually involve third parties who
would need to be recruited to the process, by persuasion or legislation.63
Those are some of the “approaches” to designing legislation that can promote
trust in the system and in the processes of commerce generally. Let us look briefly
at some specialized areas where these initiatives can work.
The first is the domain of security itself. If the challenge is untrustworthy tech-
nology, then one may be able to discourage its use and encourage trustworthy tech-
nology. This is of course a never-ending effort, rather than one that can be resolved
by just the right statute. The history of technology security legislation is already
longish. We have prohibitions on unauthorized access to computers and the theft of
computer communications.64 We have laws about the use of particular kinds of
information, such as copyrighted text (one is not allowed to disable technical pro-
tection measures designed to protect it).65 We have export controls on sensitive
information and encryption systems. We have the Budapest Cybercrime Conven-
tion66 and bills in Parliament about law enforcement access to personal information
to detect crimes.67
The second domain is related to security: privacy. One sees the link in the
description of privacy laws as “data protection” legislation (there is not a complete
overlap between all privacy and all data protection statutes, but the overlap is sig-
nificant). Privacy protection extends from prohibitions against “identity theft” (a
popular if somewhat misleading title) to requirements to limit the collection, use,
and disclosure of personal information, to a duty to keep such information secure68
and to notify people if their personal information is compromised despite that
duty.69
63 Ibid. at para. 30–42.
64 Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985 c C-46, s 342.1.
65 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, s 41, 41.1.
66 The Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention and supporting documents, including
“Guidance Notes” about its implementation, are available at Action Against Economic
Crime, online: Council of Europe
<http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/default_en.asp>.
Canada has signed the Convention but not yet ratified it.
67 Bill C-30, the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act,
1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012 contained a number of such provisions. It is online: Parliament
of Canada
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=5380965>. It was
later withdrawn because of controversy about its effect on privacy. Somewhat similar
powers are granted in the cyberbullying statute introduced in 2013. Bill C-13, Protect-




68 See for example PIPEDA, supra note 28, Schedule 1, s 4.7, Principle 7: Safeguards.
69 See for example, Personal Information Protection Act (Alberta). SA 2003, c P-6.5, s
34; Personal Health Information Protection Act (Ontario), SO 2004 c3, Sched 4, s 12;
Uniform Protection of Privacy Amendment Act (Data Breach Notification) (2010) at p
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Security and privacy are sometimes at odds, however. The desire of “security”
authorities for full authentication of individuals can conflict with the principle of
collecting only the minimum personal information required for the purpose. Indus-
try Canada’s 2004 Principles of Authentication70 recognized this potential, and we
have seen it in law enforcement case law and legislation. A “dialogue” continues.
However, one also sees privacy interests complemented by security measures,
popularly now known as “privacy by design”, a concept promoted by Ontario’s
Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ann Cavoukian.71 I mentioned earlier
Lawrence Lessig’s “code is law” principle. This is “code as law” in action, with the
appropriate focus on the policy of the law expressed by the code. People’s willing-
ness to engage in electronic communications increases if they think their privacy is
protected.
A third domain where legislation may be promising is the regulation of the
services of “trust providers.” As noted earlier, it may not be ideal to give transac-
tions conducted through identification certifiers (“certification service providers” as
UNCITRAL has called them)72 special legal status. It may, however, make sense to
set standards of trustworthiness for them to follow. One can debate whether those
standards should be set by law or published as guidelines, or whether a full-fledged
licensing program should be established. Different countries have tried different
strategies, but if the activities of such businesses are to succeed in increasing trust
in e-communications, one understands the argument that they must themselves be
reliable. The Model Law on Electronic Signatures contains a number of criteria for
such a standard of reliability.73 The new EU regulation on authentication, a draft of
which was released in 2012, continues a similar program.74
As I mentioned, none of this discussion constitutes the design of actual legisla-
tion to enhance trust, but I submit that it is laying out relevant criteria for such
legislation. I might in closing mention one issue close to my own heart, or at least
close to my own work: should government benefit from special rules? Is govern-
ment especially trustworthy, so as to be — as has been suggested — the ultimate
12 ff, online: Uniform Law Conference of Canada <http://ulcc.ca/en/2010-halifax-
ns/573-civil-section-documents-2010/812-uniform-protection-of-privacy-data-breach-
notification-report-2010>.
70 Industry Canada, Principles for Electronic Authentication (2004) at 18, online: Indus-
try Canada <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic-
ceac.nsf/vwapj/authentication.pdf/$file/authentication.pdf>.
71 Privacy by Design, supra note 7.
72 In the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Signatures, supra note 26 at article 2
(definition), article 9 (rules of conduct) and article 10 (standards of trustworthiness).
73 Ibid. at article 10.
74 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in
the internal market, 2012/0146 (COD) at articles 15–19, online: European Union Law
<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0238:FIN:EN:PDF> [Pro-
posal for Trust Services].
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identification authority? Should it have special duties or special privileges because
of its position as the representative of all the people?
The Uniform Electronic Commerce Act allows government to impose special
restrictions — “information technology requirements” — on incoming electronic
communications.75 Its consent to such communications cannot be presumed. Gov-
ernment needs to protect its systems, and many of these communications do not
arise under a contract or by agreement at all. Many people communicate with gov-
ernment because they have to. They may not be concerned about harmonizing with
the government’s system.
It may be noted that the European Union’s proposal for a new regulation on
electronic authentication privileges authentication methods used for accessing pub-
lic services.76 Moreover, the main users of secure electronic signatures in Europe
(and possibly elsewhere) are governments communicating with the public, or with
businesses. In Canada, many corporations are required to file their tax returns
electronically.77
Do these measures create trust or resentment? Governments in Canada had
privacy obligations well before the public sector — they are held to a higher stan-
dard. They pay a lot of attention to security, national and transactional. They are to
a serious extent a model user of technology, though obviously not in all domains or
for all purposes. Arguably that means that they are more trusted, and that the peo-
ple expect conduct that will justify that trust. How the higher standards are re-
flected in legislation, however, is often unclear.
XII. CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that legislation is not the primary source of transactional secur-
ity, that is to say commercially effective trust, in the electronic or in the offline
world, because law tends to be one size that does not fit all. There are also limits to
how “granular” (i.e. case-specific) legislation can be, but one finds so many shades
and notions of identity, attributes, and authority, and everyone makes his/her/its
own evaluation, i.e. judgment of what and who to trust. Risk tolerance varies. Data
vary. Technology evolves. In Internet-speak, YMMV!78
Even in the time I have been paying attention to these questions, there has
been a notable progression in thinking about legislation. Backing up a few years, it
is fair to say that from the mid-1980s through 2000, thoughts about what law re-
form was needed to deal with e-commerce progressively simplified. Less and less
was thought needed to remove barriers, as demonstrated by the English Law Com-
75 Uniform Electronic Commerce Act, supra note 14. See for example paragraphs 8(b),
9(b), 10(b), 11(c).
76 Proposal for Trust Services, supra note 74 at article 6(1)(b).
77 Canada Revenue Agency, “Mandatory Internet Filing for T2 Corporation Tax Re-
turns”, online: Canada Revenue Agency <http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/gncy/bdgt/2009/fqt2-eng.html>. Tax filers must use tax filing commercial
software certified by the government and use approved transmission methods, to ensure
security.
78 Your Mileage May Vary: you may have different results in your own analysis.
26   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [12 C.J.L.T.]
mission’s conclusion that no law reform at all was needed to deal with electronic
signatures.
However, it is arguable that the past decade has seen the evolution of a grow-
ing theme of regulation of systems. Maybe this is due to a growing concern about
cybersecurity.
Legislation can be a useful source of system security. This is not so much by
requiring such things as secure electronic signatures in crucial transactions, but by
encouragement of transparency, effective dispute resolution, appropriate cyber-
security against outsiders (risk from complete outsiders rather than risk from an-
other transactional party), and similar measures outside the actual transactions
where individual commercial judgments of trust would apply. Everyone will have
their own threat/risk analysis, and trust threshold.
It is important to consider in the analysis all of the sources of trust I mentioned
at the outset, from personal morality through reputation to institutions (notably law)
to technology. Enhancements to trust may draw on all of them in different degrees
for different purposes. While one cannot legislate trust, one can nourish the condi-
tions in which it will grow, and properly designed legislation has a role to play in
that nutritional exercise.
In conclusion, it would appear that law reformers like me are not going to be
put out of business, but our business should be changing its focus, at least if we are
going to legislate the conditions for trust. 
